Richard M. Nixon:The Great Silent Majority Good Evening, my fellow Americans Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world the war in Vietnam i believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Govemment has told them about our policy. The American eople cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that i know are on the minds of many of you listening to me How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the wan? What are the prospects for peace? Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20 th The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the ations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace pro The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friend, as well as our enemies. abroad In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged withdrawal of all American forces From a political stand point, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next electi had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world
Richard M. Nixon: "The Great Silent Majority" Good Evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friend, as well as our enemies, abroad. In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war. But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnsons war becomes Nixons war. The great question is: How can we win America's peace? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution In response to the request of the govemment of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the peop le of South Vietnam in their efforts of prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent Americ comb at forces to south vietnam Now many believe that President Johnsons decision to send American combat forces to South vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted But the question facing us today is-now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor Ve saw a prelude of what would happen in South vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South vietnam when the communists took over in the north For the United States this first defeat in our nation s history would result in a collapse of conf idence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and Inderstood what had to be done In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts of prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam. Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is -- now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labo r camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North. For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world. Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a
stable Govemment there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence Ve believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we're going to stay there President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace --in the middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war. For these reasons I rejected the recommendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election Ve have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that were willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and go faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the govemment of South vietnam as we leave We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum
stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there. President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war. For these reasons I rejected the recommendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American fo rces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave. We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum
That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed did not wait for through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North ietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of Stare Rogers, my assistant for national security aff airs, Dr Kissinger; Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started In addition. we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other govemments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam one of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks I spoke directly in this office, where I'm now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of maki statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bring ing the war to an end Dear Mr President I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of vietnam.The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of vietnam Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides tuned their face towards peace rather than toward conf lict and war I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on Aug. 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text
That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of Stare Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger; Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progres s toward bringing the war to an end. “Dear Mr. President: “I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face towards peace rather than toward conflict and war." I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on Aug. 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text
of both letters is being released to the press In addition to the public meetings that I've referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnams chief negotiator in paris in 11 private sessions And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on Jan 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table at fault? It's becoming clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to th war is not the president of the United States it is not the south vietnamese govemment the obstacle is the other side s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession and our next concession af ter that one, until it gets everything it wants There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi s deciding to negotiate- to negotiate serously I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth the bad news as well as the good news- where the lives of our young men are involved Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time w launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the r through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front It is in line with the major shift in U. S foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25 Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams Ve Americans are a do- t -yourself people- we're an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign polic」 In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States fumished most of the money, most of the armament and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom
of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public meetings that I’ve referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office o n Jan. 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s becoming clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved. Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams. We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we’re an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the armament and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom