ome of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not

Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(Q, (Ti, ai, piie), Ri is the event Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture

Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile

Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d

From or:226.1.227.1.229.1.237.1.243.1 For 243.1, also prove that the reputational equilibrium is sequential

By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium

复旦大学：《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义（初、中、高级篇）03 高级宏观：经济增长理论

复旦大学：《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义（初、中、高级篇）02 高级宏观：迭代模型

复旦大学：《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义（初、中、高级篇）01 高级宏观：拉姆齐模型

广东金融学院：2016年毕业生就业质量报告